May, 1929

BOOK REVIEWS
JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SMUGGLING.

William E. Masterson.
xxvi, 423.

The Macmillan Company, New York, 1929.

By
Pp.

The firing upon and sinking on March 22d, 1929, of the British auxiliary
schooner "I'm Alone," by the Coast Guard Patrol boat "Dexter," and the consequent exchange of notes of justification and protest between our Government
and the British and Canadian Governments, and the questions of international
law involved in the controversy, lends emphasis to the timeliness of the publication of this very excellent book.
Examined in the light of the questions raised by the incident above-referred
to, the merit of the book as the depository of a very thorough and logical research, is made more markedly apparent. Before the advent of this work, a
student of the questions involved would have to search among many sources
of international law, including British and American statutes, and under various
headings such as "Territorial Waters," "Right of Seizure Under Rvenue Acts,"
etc., before being able to arrive at a synthetic idea of the subject-matter involved.
The difficulty of finding the law on the questions covered by the book is
pointed out by the author in his preface, where he states that it has been
necessary for him to trace the history of smuggling itself, in order to properly
explain the laws passed to end smuggling. Background has had to be established,
necessitating a research' extending through centuries, in order that a proper
understanding of various statutes and treaties, dealing with the subject-matter,
might be understood. New sources of diplomatic correspondence have been
examined and in some cases fully set forth.
The author is well equipped to make the study, having been an active practitioner in New York and having done graduate work at Harvard and the
University of London, the latter University having conferred upon him the degree of LL.D. He has also assisted the committee of experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, appointed by the Council of the
League of Nations.
Even a cursory examination of the book will demonstrate that its preparation has been scholarly and thorough, and that its existence will prove to be a
great aid to students and practitioners of the subjects which it covers, and careful reading causes unhesitating commendation. Beginning in the 17th Century,
when no seaward limit existed for seizure of vessels violating Revenue Acts, the
author takes up the distances set at different intervals, principally by the English Government and our own, tracing the changes and the reasons for the
changes as developed by the needs of time, until the author reaches the recent
treaties having to do with the enforcement of the liquor law. These treaties,
with the various cases which have arisen since their passage, are exhaustively
and learnedly discussed, and the position taken by our Government and that
of Great Britain in the interpretation of the treaty between them, and the rights
claimed thereunder, clearly indicated.
(932)
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The author is most sparing in arriving at general conclusions from his
research, and most cautious in his statements as to the law, and leaves the
subject, as it were, in a state of flux, a situation in which it may fairly now
be said to be.
The index is rather ample, but might well be more so. The list of statutes
and table of cases render the use of the book by the practitioner much more facile
and give ready access to the wealth of information which the book contains.
On the whole the book, for authoritative sources of the subject which it covers,
cannot be too highly recommended.
William J. Conlen.
Philadelphia.

By Elijah N. Zoline. (Third
Edition.) By Alexander Holtzoff. Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., New York,
1928. P:P. xcvi, 792.

FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE.

The third edition of this book, it having originally appeared twelve years
ago, is a one-volume work of nearly eight hundred pages and, therefore, is evidently intended for the use of the busy lawyer in presenting the essentials of the
subject treated. It does not assume to go into the subject with the same detail
as more voluminous works. It is the handy kind of work which a lawyer having
a case in a federal court, appealed or to be appealed, may use to point out the
way in which it should be handled on review. It is rather a preliminary guide
than a determining or deciding and final instructor. The lawyer using it, therefore, if the exigencies of his case require it, may have to amplify the information he obtains from it, by consulting some more comprehensive work on the
points in which he is interested.
The book has the merit of brevity. It was written by a practitioner familiar
with the federal practice. I have been able to find in it references not to be
found in any other work on the subject. On the other hand, unfortunately, it
has some inaccuracies which should be guarded against For instance, it is
stated that "appeals to the Supreme Court from the Court of Claims as of right
have been abolished. Appeals may now be taken by permission only and solely
in two classes of cases." 1 The section of the United States code referred to in
support of this statement provides not for "appeal," but for review by the
Supreme Court, on certification of questions by the Court of Claims and upon
certiorari. Besides, several Acts of Congress give jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court on appeal in claims against the United States by different bands of
Indians? Again, unfortunately, the book went to press before the passage of
the Act of April 26, 1928, modifying the Act of January 3, 1928, which abolished,
but as a form of procedure only, writs of error in the federal courts.
An appendix, which contains the rules of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, will
bo of value to practitioners. I know of no other recent book which contains
'ZoLINE,
FEDERAL APPELLATE JURIsDICTION AND PROCEDURE (3d ed.
1928) 134.
'See The Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians v. U. S., :277
U. S. 424,48 Sup. Ct. 536 (x928).
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them. The book also contains a table of cases, always useful in a work of this
kind.
It was the ambition of the author, Mr. Zoline, to revise the second edition of
his work and bring it up to date. His untimely death, which cut off one of our
ablest federal practitioners almost in the prime of life, prevented this. Mr.
Holtzoff, with the exception of the minor defects above noticed, and some typographical slipups, has done his work well.
Wt. J. Hughes.
Washingtoip,D. C.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS.

Press' New York, 1928. Pp.

By Ernest J.Eberling. Columbia University
452.

This work is styled by the author, "A Study of the Origin and Development
of the Power of Congress to Investigate and Punish for Contempt." The subject
is quite a timely one inasmuch as Congressional investigations have been unusually frequent during the past dight years and some of them have been of such
importance as to arouse and long sustain an absorbing public interest. By what
right may the Houses of Congress make such investigations and to what extent
may they use coercive methods in obtaining information? No doubt this question has frequently come to the minds of many thoughtful citizens of our country
during the past few years. The author answers in a way that is truly enlightening. He has done his work thoroughly and well.
The treatment of the subject follows the historical order and this is a highly
commendable feature of the work. Only by following out its historical development may we adequately appreciate the nature and scope of a constitutional
power of Congress that is not possessed by express grant and is therefore either
inherent or implied. After tracing the origin and development of inquisitorial
power in the British Parliament and in the Colonial Assemblies prior to the adoption of our Constitution a following chapter treats of investigation procedure up
to and including the year 1827 when the House of Representatives in summoning
witnesses for the purpose of acquiring information for their guidance in legislation vested its committee with the power to send for persons and papers. The
next division is from 1827 to 1876 when an unwilling witness carried his appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, and the final one is from the centennial
year to the present time with its vivid recollections of much investigated oil land
transactions.
That Congressional investigations may be quite necessary is beyond question.
That the power to make such investigations may become but a useless vacuity if
it be not accompanied by the power to force the disclosure of necessary information, is a fact that both reason and experience plainly manifest. Yet, whether
the imprisonment of a recalcitrant witness be regarded as punishment, or as a
coercive measure to compel disclosure, it bears unmistakably the external features of judicial proceeding. Surely it was the purpose of those who framed our
Constitution, to separate the legislative from the judicial functions. But just as
surely has experience taught us, the separation cannot be absolute and complete.
The legislative, executive and judicial functions are so correlated and interdependent that contact may at times become conflict by unavoidable necessity.
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The question is much like the relation between federal and state authority which
occasions the outstanding irrepressible conflict of our national life. We have
more than one irrepressible conflict and we must expect them, resign ourselves
to them, meet them with courage. Since our fathers have met the great problems of the past and left to us a rich inheritance of guiding principles, we have
no reason to fear the problems of the future, if, inspired by the example of our
forebears, we meet new issues as they arise, with frank justice and charitable
consideration.
The power to punish for contempt is one that may be easily abused even
when employed by the courts, and its use postulates in the most exalted jurist
the finest exercise of his wise and unselfish discretion. Just when does a Congressional investigation cease to be a warranted quest for needed information
and when does it become "a fishing expedition into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime," or "a search through all the
respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something may turn
up"? Perhaps through patient endeavor and wise forbearance we may come in
the near future to more definite and specific regulation, which, while safeguarding the essential powers of Congress, will leave to citizens of our republic
undiminished enjoyment of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Lius A4. Lilly.
University.
School of Law, St. Louis

THE LANCE Op JusTicE. A Semi-centennial History of the Legal Aid Society
i8 7 6-i 92 6. By John MacArthur Maguire, with a foreword by William
.D.Guthrie, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1928. Pp. xi, 305.
Legal Aid is a term applied to the task of supplying a poor person with
the services of a lawyer without cost to the client. The words are also used
to include a whole field of activity in the administration of justice, by which
the man without money is given, in practice, a position before the law, equal
to that of any other man. The justification for such activity lies in our
state and federal constitutions, in the various bills of rights which promise the
individual the "equal protection of the law."
As the work is designed to give a lawyer's services without a fee paid by
the client it has become substantially a part of the administration of justice
which is now generally under the control and supervision of the legal profession. While the average person retains his own lawyer, special provisions
must be made for perhaps half of the people of the United States who cannot
afford the luxury of a law suit, but who are none the less confronted with legal
problems of great magnitude to them.
Under conditions of a hundred years ago I fin1" no mention of legal
aid organizations. Professor C. R. Fisk in his The Rise of the Common Man
1830-.85o mentions the labor and various humanitarian movements, but leaves
one with the impression that legislation and not administration was then the
major problem of the law. Thus he says:
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"Trade in rural communities was represented by one or two store
keepers who performed some of the functions of bankers; the professions
Dy two or three ministers, several lawyers, a physician and a school
teacher . . . Legislative bodies of state and church, and the practice of

law' in circuit courts, state and national, had been almost the only means
of bringing people from different localities into personal contact; almost
the only national reputations had been those of political leaders and clergy,
lawyers and military heroes."
Tlie courts occupied a different position in those days--closer to the peopleeasier of access-less of a mystery.
It would appear that there were fewer lawyers in those days, that they
perhaps accepted fees in kind rather than in money and that as life moved at a
more leisurely pace a lawyer would not object sometimes if asked to spend
fifteen minutes talking over a legal problem with some impecunious client.
It is also probably true that people at large did not have incomes so divergent
as now separate the multi-millionaire from the pauper. There were fewer
paupers as well as fewer millionaires. The client probably was less hesitant
then than now in asking free service.
Add a hundred years to this life and several million people and we meet
the spectacle of the great modern city.
Division of labor makes the legal profession the absolute custodian of
the law. The individual, is lost in the mass of his fellows and few have the
time to turn aside from their own struggle to hear the lament of their neighbor, who may be denied justice and unable to pay for redress. Life runs along
outside of the law for many people in a large city. The logic in ponderous law
books does not always come home to poor people in time of need. For such
persons justice is an empty name, they come to believe that the law is for the
rich and not for the poor. So we need not be surprised when men like John
W. Davis say:
"It must always be borne in mind that our system of democracy could
not long endure if the poor in our populous and congested cities became
convinced that they were being denied redress, protection, and equality before the law because of inability to pay for legal services, and were in
consequence being oppressed and placed at an unfair disadvantage before
our courts of justice in securing their legal rights. Such a conviction
would inevitably generate a bitter feeling of intense resentment and disloyalty, and the existence of this feeling would be a constant and terrible
menace to society."
To avert what might well have been a national catastrophe came the legal
aid society-the poor man's law office-the "arm of the bar outstretched in helpfulness" to insure the "equal protection of the law." While such societies now
exist in many cities our interest here is in the oldest and largest, the New York
Legal Aid Society, 1876 to date.
The Lance of Justice is the story of this society and the courageous men
who built it up to its present position as the largest law office in the world.
The years of growth have meant struggle. The Society had little more money
than the clients it represented and only the devoted labor of its officers and
over-worked staff enabled it to make headway. It is close to genius to handle
law cases on an avzerage expenditure of $i.oo a case, for office rent, salaries,
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telephone and other overhead charges. Figures, however, tell us nothing of the
human elements in the story.
Mr. Maguire's book describes dramatically struggles between the Society
and enterprising persons who called themselves legal aid societies as a cloak for
widespread swindling operations. Imprisonment for debts, war cases, crimps,
cranks, instalment dealers, small loans, domestic relations, personal injury
claims flood the pages, with matters of the most personal human interest.
Names of splendid men appear in connection with the work. Charles Evans
Hughes, Carl Schurz, Theodore Roosevelt, Joseph H. Choate, Robert W. DeForest, Elihu Root, Lyman Abbott. But above them all is the personality of
Arthur V. Briesen, the great philanthropic leader of the bar, who was president of the Society from I8go until 1916.
The men on the firing line-the attorneys of the Society from Mr. Lexow
to the present incumbent, Mr. McGee, are also worthy of note. It takes
courage to fight bucket shops, instalment sale frauds, inactive city marshalls,
the loan shark, the officers of a ship where two men have been shanghaied.
Yet the attorneys for the Society did this as part of their daily work and
thought nothing of taking their lives in their hands. The public today would
not know of this work but for Mr. Maguire's book. As one reads the pages,
all too short for the subject, the practice of the law ceases to appear merely a
contest according to rigid rules with a fee as a reward. Instead it becomes
a glorious adventure, such as Drake or Hawkins might have sought; Robin
Hood's life was no more adventurous than that of Mr. McGee, the present
attorney in chief.
Too often now-a-days the law student comes to look upon his professional
life as something shut in by the covers of his law book. He forgets Launcelot
in the ascetic labors of a comparatively cloistered life. Such a man finds
pleasant exhaustion in a rude bout with the Rule in Shelley's case or the cy-pres
doctrine. Not so the legal aid attorney. He knows not what problem will
confront him when the door of his office *swings open, and it is constantly
swinging open. He does know that he must meet life in the raw with courage, judgment, the fullest sympathy for the client. Mr. Maguire makes us see
this. That is why the book is so fascinating. The reader observes a cross
section of life as though he were sitting at the interviewing desk of the New
York Society. Mr. Maguire has made a distinct contribution to the romance
of the practice of law. As one reads these pages the lawyer looms larger
than the person who makes stenographers and office boys tremble and who in
turn is subdued by the court.
The picture, which the public has too often of a lawyer, as a hired mercenary fighting merely for a fee, fades out. In its place we see a disinterested
champion somewhat of the crusader type who fights for the principle of equal
justice. The word "Lance" in the title suggests adventure; the reader will find
it on every page.
John S. Bradway.
Philadelphia.

938

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE.

By A. A. Berle, Jr. Callaghan

& Co., Chicago, 1928. Pp. xxvii, i99.
In this brief, but meaty, and fascinating book, Professor Berle has ventured
a prophecy, and the commonplace that prophecy is dangerous has an answer in
the other commonplace, "Nothing ventured, nothing gained." Professor Berle is
an iconoclast, and we suspect he rather enjoys smashing the old gargoyles which
decorate the cathedral of finance. Nevertheless, one is impressed by the fact
that he has not selected a hammer at random and gone out to break images with
the same unintelligent abandon which characterized the late Carrie Nation. He
takes as his thesis the proposition that the constantly changing situations in corporation finance demand frequent revisions to determine which of the old rules
are worthy of preservation and which should be altered or deleted in the interest
of progress.
The initial attack is upon the entity theory of the corporation. Professor
Berle insists that the idea of paternal control which the state claims over the
corporation arose initially because of the ambitious greed of the Stuart kings,
and acquired strength by reason of the ecclesiastical theory of mystic control
imported from the Roman Catholic Church, which used it to govern subordinate
units within that great organization. Professor Berle insists that in the evolution o-f corporation finance it is becoming more and more apparent that the
entity theory must retire in favor, of the far more business-like theory of contractual relationship between the stockholders, subject of course to regulation by
the state as to matters in which it is directly concerned. In other words, he
regards a corporate charter merely as a permit to do business and not as a
creative grant from the Commonwealth.
One may ask legitimately why the author stresses with such emphasis what
appears to many people to be a rather academic distinction. Professor Berle's
answer is of interest because it clearly demonstrates the point of view which he
employs throughout the entire book. In stating the importance of the distinction which he makes regarding the entity theory, the author asserts that if the
essence of a corporation lies in its contractual character and not in the fact that
it receives a charter grant from the state, the function of the state is limited to
regulating matters which concern itself and in consequence the rights of stockholders are radically changed and they possess the power to alter many of
their rights without first obtaining the permission of the state through charter
amendments or other evidences of governmental consent.
It is quite true that a strong argument can be made, and Professor Berle
makes it, in favor of emphasizing the contractual nature of the corporate agreement rather than the paternalistic grant of power from the state; but the weakness is the difficulty in adducing concrete confirmation on the basis of established
precedent and present practice. But he is able to cite two or three cases, notably
Dainder v. Continental Tyre and Rubber CompanLy,' where it was held that the
character of a corporation could be determined from the living members of the
group who constituted the corporation for business purposes and that that character was not merely the fictional personality which a logical application of the
entity theory would result in finding it to be. This decision, however, seems to
1

[i916]

2

A. C. 307.
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the reviewer to have been controlled by war conditions in that the majority of
the stockholders of the company were Germans, whence it seems that its value
as a precedent is open to question. In the United States, Professor Berle cites"
United Mibe Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Company.2 Again it would
seem that the decision was a result of opportunism. The technical objection was
raised that as the United Mine Workers of America were not incorporated it
would be necessary for the coal company to serve notice of the suit on each one
of the union's two million members in order to start proceedings legally. But
the Court seemed to feel that the case should be tried, and for that purpose,
regarded an association of individuals as a legal entity, since they were associated for common purposes and had a common fund of property to further such
purposes. Such a decision would not seem to derogate from the general applicability of the long recognized theory that corporations are created by the state.
The reviewer, however, believes that the entity theory has more advantages than
dangers, for unquestionably the state must have more power over corporations
than merely to permit them to do business and to tax them.
In subsequent chapters Professor Berle discusses in detail, and in the same
stimulating and scintillating manner in which he attacks the entity theory, such
interesting and timely topics as the present position of corporate management,
the control of corporations through the use of non-voting stock-particularly on
the part of investment bankers, and the use of no-par value stock to further the
designs of those who control the corporate destinies. Towards the end of the
book the author includes a stimulating chapter on holding companies which,
however, bears the rather unilluminating title of Subsidiary Corporations and
Control of Credit Resources.
All through these latter chapters the dominant idea seems to be that, in the
present stage of development, corporation finance is deeply affected by a certain
unity of purpose on the part of many powerful men who own and operate the
country's largest corporations. The author evidently believes that such men
desire to fortify the right of an intelligent minority to direct and control the
destinies of a constantly increasing majority and he seeks to show that the legal
rights of such majorities are being constantly limited with the idea of protecting
the interior leadership and making a permanent plan of corporate development
not merely a possibility but as nearly as can be a certainty. There is no question
that there is a great deal of truth in the foregoing siatement. Nevertheless, it
does not follow that an extreme position can be fully justified, and Professor
Berle does seem to the reviewer to be extreme.
Quite evidently the author is constantly seeking weapons to use in behalf of
his theory, and he has apparently selected as his favorite blade the well-tested
maxim cf fiduciary responsibility. True it is that in order to wield it effectively
he is compelled to go beyond the present state of the law and to describe legal
situations rather as he thinks they should be than as they are, but after all this
is one of the features which makes the book so vital, interesting and alive.
Professor Berle desires to make it imperative that in the absence of voting
power the unrepresented majority shall automatically become the cestai que
trustent of the inside voting crowd. It may be suggested that under the law as
it stands today, the rights of minorities are well protected against deceit and
'259

U. S. 344,

42

Sup. Ct. 570

(1922).
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fraud and the same protection may readily be applied to non-voting majorities,
but it may well be doubted that Professor Berle's theory of extreme fiduciary
responsibility will receive much judicial support for some time to come.
Probably the most interesting and stimulating chapter in the book is that
which deals with no-par value stock. Seldom" before has a treatise been written
which shows so clearly the problems and difficulties which have developed in
connection with such stock and the possibility of using it cleverly and effectively
to defeat the interests of the ultimate owners of the corporate property. No-par
value stock was conceived as an instrument of reform, but we agree with Professor Berle that it has now become one of the best weapons in the armory of
corporate reactionaries.
Considered as a whole, this book is a welcome addition to the library of
every student of corporation finance. It seeks to do in a thoughtful and technical
way what Dr. William Z. Ripley attempted with much skill and wit to accomplish in a popular vein. It is provocative, delightful and stimulating. It is
well documented for a book of this kind, but the proofs used do not always seem
to substantiate the statements made. The book is either well in advance of its
time or it is a brilliant tour de force which the years to come may fail to justify.
It is almost feminine in its quality of constant change. It is often logical but
as often illogical. At one point the reader vigorously dissents from the author's
conclusions, and two pages later the impulse arises to cheer vigorously. Certainly it is a book which no person interested in the legal and financial development of American corporations can afford to be without, and the author should
be congratulated upon the performance of a fine piece of work which is unusually debatable and in many places truly instructive.
Theodore J. Grayson.
Philadelphia.

RIGHTS OF MINORITY STOCK AND RAILWAY SECURITY HOLDERS.

By R. S.

Harvey. (Second Edition.) Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1929. Pp.
xxviii, 452.

Twenty years ago Mr. Harvey produced a book which then interested -the
bar dealing as it did with the rights of minority stockholders. It was an outline
of the subject only; and in view of the dearth of case law on the subject, the
book purported only to expound a few general principles, drawn mainly from
English chancery decisions, sometimes more than a century old.
A second edition of this book has just come out. Unfortunately, it takes
little, if any, note of the tremendous development in case law, statute law, and

corporate mechanisms within the last two decades. The case material is substantially untouched; the general principles have not been revised in the light of
the more modern approaches to the subject matter; nothing has been done
toward working out the application of these principles to present-day situations.
Yet it is precisely in that application that lawyers, judges, and financiers, find
their major difficulties. In many instances Mr. Harvey cites rules which once
were true, and now have become practically obsolete, or perhaps remain law in
only a few jurisdictions; e. g., the statement that the rights of the preferred
stockholder are "inviolable'--a statement which is approximately true in New
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Jersey, much modified elsewhere, and almost thoroughly nullified in Delaware.'
The entire discussion of non-voting stock in Mr. Harvey's book revolves around
the remarks of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the Nickel Plate Unification casef although the storm center of this controversy has lain in New
York banking houses, in the Stock Exchange rules, and in the now famous
Goodyear litigation!' There are some interesting suggestions in the latter part
of the book which deals with railway security holders; but these are scattered
and incomplete.
The lay reader will get a few interesting impressions from this book. But
he will be a sadder and wiser man when he attempts to make them practically
effective. The lawyer will find that its generalizations leave to him the job of
inserting the necessary qualifications, discovering situations to which they apply,
and finally, making them enforceable. This was a fair book in i9o9. It is an
historical survival in i929.
4. A. Berle, Jr.
New York City.

CASES AND

OTHER MATERIALS

ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION.

By Philip

Mechem and Thomas E. Atkinson. The Lawyers Co-operative Pub. Co.,
Rochester, 1928. Pp. iv, 703.
The old adage that "two heads are better than one" is amply borne out in
the joint preparation of this new casebook on wills and administration. Whenever a new casebook appears in a field in which there are already two excellent
outstanding works, by Warren and Costigan, the question at once is presented
why it ventures into the territory. Of course, the law in any field is continually
expanding, with new problems being presented for solution by the legal order
so that casebooks must be revised and new material added, with rearrangement
of older material. But this is not the only excuse for this new casebook on
wills, for its entire organization justifies its appearance. It is packed with footnote material, usually in the form of questions on cases briefly stated, with their
citations. This arouses the interest of the student to read the cases themselves,
and thus encourages collateral reading, as well as application of the principle of
the principal case to those stated in the footnotes.
In the six hundred ninety-eight pages of text are to be found slightly over
three hundred cases, most of them drawn from American jurisdictions; in fact,
among the first ninety-three cases are to be found only some twenty-two from
English jurisdictions. And in that part of the book where administration of
estates is dealt with, no English cases, as principal ones, are found. In my opinion, this virtual omission of the English cases is probably justifiable, in view of
the fact that the law of wills is largely statutory. There is, on the other hand,
much to be gained in tracing the evolution of the law of wills through the great
'Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., i42 Atl. 654 (Del. W2a8), Note
(1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 256.
2 105
3

I. C. C. 425 (1926).

See BEiL,

. 25.
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63,
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landmarks of the English decisions. This method is probably overdone in many
casebooks of the past, originating as they do from an era when the Historical
School was dominant in American juristic thought. The authors have probably
solved the problem in the fashion of presentation they have followed.
Going through the volume very carefully during the past several months, in
order to do justice to the compilers in reviewing it, I have been impressed with
the accuracy with which treatment is afforded of the cases in my own jurisdiction, namely, Illinois. Such variations, usually given in footnote form, relative
to advancements, the right of the slayer to inherit from his intestate victim, the
revocation by subsequent marriage of the testator even though he provides for
his intended wife, are all correctly treated with reference to Illinois holdings. I
was disappointed, however, that equally brief consideration of Illinois holdings
was not given with reference to disherison of testator's children, and survival of
death actions, both of which have had some odd variations in our State. However, these are minor matters and must be left to the individual instructor to
develop in class instruction and collateral reading. The same can be said also,
probably, of the brief treatment in a footnote, of the old principle of executor
de son tort, which still flourishes in such a staid common law jurisdiction as
Illinois.
The convenient size of the volume, due to its thin paper and the enormous
labor spent on footnotes in compact form, gives additional value to the casebook.
In my judgment this volume is at present the best in existence due to its modernity and its excellent treatment of the entire field.
E. F. Albertsworth.
Law School, Northwestern University.

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW.

V0L I.

PEAcE.

Fourth edition. By A. D.

McNair. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1928.

Pp. 827.

Among all the jurists who in the last half century have contributed to the
development of international law few, if any, would be deemed more worthy than
Oppenheim to stand in the great succession of Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and
Vattel. No man ever gave himself more wholly to the work or, in doing so,
commanded greater devotion among collaborators and disciples. The two editions of his general treatise which have appeared since his death, that by Mr.
Roxburgh in 192o and the present one by Mr. McNair, owe more than a little
to this pietas. The editors have dealt gently with features of the great man's
work which others, not bound to him by the same ties, might have frankly
rejected. It happens thus that serious imperfections are being handed on with
sometimes a mild footnote, sometimes nothing at all, to warn the many elementary students who resort to this book as ratio scripta.
As a catalogue of significant events in the intercourse of States, illumined
by the benevolence of a truly international mind, this treatise has scarce been
surpassed. It savours of ingratitude, almost of heresy, to criticize. But Oppenheim's general theory seems at many points not merely out of date but
doubting and confused.
Who, for example, can follow the logic of his exposition of the sources
of international law? As everybody knows, he declares that custom and treaty
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are the sole sources. Custom he describes as a fact through which common
consent comes into existence, whereas surely it is a result of, and therefore
presupposes, common consent. If he had said "through which common consent
becomes known" or "in which common consent manifests itself," the statement
would have had some meaning and would have assigned to custom its true significance, namely that it is the generalized practice proving the consensus with-:
out which no rule can exist. His use of treaty as the other source leads him
into the inconsistency of "particular international law." Once law has been
defined, as Oppenheim defines it, as "a body of rules for human conduct within
a community which by common consent of this community shall be enforced by
external power," it becomes logically impossible to talk of "particular law."
The consent of States A and B is not the common consent of the community
of nations, and it is inaccurate to say that their agreement that A shall admit
B's products under an intermediate tariff makes such admission any part of
the law of the community. What the law prescribes is that if A agrees to perform a service in the interest of B he shall be bound to perform it. A and B,
by taking advantage of this law, impose legally enforceable duties upon one
another. Naturally, a treaty joining all civilized States as parties would form
part of international law, because its provisions would constitute rules adopted
by common consent. Failing this ideal unanimity, it is only by narrowing the
conception of community to the parties actually concerned that contracts between States can be called law, and the result is merely to add further complexity to an already complex term.
As for those time-honored slogans, the fundamental rights of Stater,
Oppenheim takes them away with one hand and gives them back with the
other. What does it profit to deny their existence as rights and to set them
up as legally protected qualities inherent in international personality? No
sooner has the author asserted "the fact, involved in the very membership of
the Family of Nations, that equality, dignity, independence, territorial and personal supremacy, and the responsibility of every State are recognized by every
other State," than he must begin undermining the proposition by exceptions.
His difficulty is that the alleged fact is simply not a fact. The equality of
States means nothing more than that the law accords them equal protection for
such rights as they have been endowed with by the circumstances of situation
and growth. As a premise to the conclusion that "whenever a question arises
which has to be settled by the consent of the members of the Family of Nations, every State has a right to a vote, but to one vote only," this "fundamental right" or "quality," constantly taken out of its proper sphere, has
proved a stumbling block to progress. *When it has been said that certain
rights, accorded to States by the common law of nations, are more vital than
others derived from the same source or from treaty, and therefore justify
more drastic action for their protection, there is nothing of substance left
for formulation as a doctrine of fundamental qualities, and even this measure of
distinction becomes doubtful in a system which admits the enforcement of quite
ordinary rights by such an instrument as pacific blockade.
It has not been forgotten that this is a review, not of Oppenheim, but of
Mr. McNair's Oppenheim. My point is that this edition would have been a
better text book if more had been done to avoid perpetuating defective doctrine.

944

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

With all its incongruities, the treatise has always been decidedly useful, and its
usefulness is maintained and enhanced by notes, additional sections and appendices which acquaint the reader with new theory and contemporary international organization.
Out of all the additions, I can do no more than select a few which I have
found most interesting. A great deal has been done to clear away the difficulties that cling to the question of recognition. In the first place the editor has
defined and emphasized the difference between recognizing a State and recognizing a government. Secondly, his treatment of de facto and de jure recognition,
which reinforces the stand taken by No~l-Henry in his invaluable monograph,
"Les Gonvermnents de fait devant le juge," will go some way to dispel current
illusions upon a matter which has assumed special importance in connection
with Russia.
Two features of Mr. McNair's discussion of the status of the British
Dominions merit attention and gratitude. They are the repudiation of
the personal-union theory which is so constantly paraded in the political arena,
and the insistence on the legal unity of the Empire in time of war. On
the other hand § 496, on the treaty-making power, calls for a caveat. As
Keith has pointed out in the recent edition of his "Responsible Government
in the Dominions"' the Imperial Government still plays an important part in
the conclusion of Dominion treaties. Advice to ratify comes primarily from the
Dominion, but it has to pass through the hands and receive the countersignature of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This fact leaves
a possibility of control which has not been mentioned by Mr. McNair, but
which is essential to any accurate appreciation of the position.
P. E. Corbett.
Faculty of Law, McGill University.
'Af pp. goo and 1252.

